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Join Father Deacon Andrew Bennett and NextGEN Fellow Kristopher Kinsinger in an extended conversation about the polarizing debate that this report addresses.
Executive Summary
Freedom of religion is one of the fundamental freedoms enumerated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Advocacy of religious freedom is often misunderstood as calling for positions that would be difficult for anyone to reasonably accept. A more nuanced discussion of this right can dispel some of this misunderstanding. This paper examines the “reasonable limits” clause in section 1 of the Charter, which states that the Charter “guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in its subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
Canadian courts have treated the concept of “reasonable limits” within the Charter. The dominant treatment has been in the form of what is often called a proportionality analysis, and is often linked to a particular Supreme Court of Canada case that results in the Canadian analysis known as the “Oakes test.” This test, a framework for proportionality analysis arising from the case of R. v. Oakes in 1986, has four parts. These are “pressing and substantial objective,” “rational connection,” “minimal impairment,” and “final balancing.” Once an initial infringement of a right or freedom has been established, these four parts of the Oakes test function together to determine whether a legal limit on a right or freedom has met the standards of proportionality so as to be demonstrably justified. A law that fails to meet any of the four parts of the test is considered to have resulted in a violation of Charter rights and thus to give rise to a constitutional remedy, such as the striking down of that law. This paper describes these four parts with reference to religious-freedom cases decided in Canadian courts. It also describes some critiques that have been levelled against the Oakes test or, more broadly, against using proportionality to understand reasonable limits on rights and freedoms.
The paper continues with a discussion of recent policy and law affecting religious freedom in ways that, in our judgment, are not in line with a reasonable-limits analysis. These are the values attestation attached to the Canada Summer Jobs Program in 2018, and Quebec’s Act Respecting the Laicity of the State. In the final section of the paper, we examine some government-imposed restrictions relating to the COVID-19 pandemic and evaluate them in light of reasonable limits on religious freedom.
As a pluralist society of citizens with many different viewpoints, it is important for Canada to find ways to engage with major questions of social policy in rich ways that can overcome polarization. The concept of reasonable limits helps with understanding which limits on religious freedom are acceptable and which are unacceptable. Advocacy for rights and freedoms should be coupled with education to inform the public and facilitate discussion of the complex issues involved. Decision-makers should also redouble their efforts to engage with faith communities in order to better understand the issues and pursue policies that have fewer adverse effects on religious freedom.
Introduction
For various reasons, policy discussions on certain issues have become increasingly polarized. We have seemingly lost some of our societal ability to see possibilities of complex, challenging compromises and to see nuance in debates. This polarization presents broader societal challenges, but it raises particular issues in the context of discussing religious freedom.
Advocacy of religious freedom is often misunderstood as calling for positions that would be difficult for anyone to reasonably accept. A more nuanced conversation can dispel some of this misunderstanding. In the process, those skeptical of religious freedom, including many without religious beliefs, may see that arguments for religious freedom are for a kind of freedom that they support more than they realize.
At the same time, those advocating for religious freedom who themselves come from religious backgrounds do so within worldviews of their own. According to perspectives in those worldviews, they may assert that their faith traditions must be defended and advocated to the utmost without reservation. A richer conversation can help to make clearer why it is not always right to push for religious freedom beyond all limits. Respect for the inherent dignity of others, a value deeply grounded in many faith traditions, requires accepting some limits on the scope of religious freedom.
The idea of reasonable limits on rights and freedoms is an important one for everyone and relates to rights and freedoms more broadly. By their very nature, constitutional rights and freedoms warrant particular attention and priority. But no right can be unlimited. Issues arise in which one right ends up in a full-fledged contradiction with another right, and it is not clear how to reconcile the two. And issues arise regarding how other interests of a free and democratic society are to be achieved in our shared life together. Understanding rights and freedoms requires also understanding the limits on them, and it is thus important for everyone.
The challenging question in the context at hand is how to understand reasonable limits on religious freedom. That question is one for much philosophical reflection and for theological discussion within faith traditions. But, in terms of how we live together in Canada right now, it is a subject for legal discussion and analysis. That kind of legal discussion may help with further philosophical and theological engagement with the question. But a legal analysis also determines what practically happens with the scope of religious freedom under our constitutional arrangements. It is important to consider where a well-grounded legal analysis of reasonable limits leads.
There may be different ways in which reasonable limits on religious freedom come to be understood in different times and places. Because of combinations of principles and circumstances, we are speaking here of complex policy questions rather than universal truth, even while there might be one such truth on some aspects of the questions. But engaging with legal principles concerning reasonable limits on religious freedom in Canada today helps with thinking about analogous questions elsewhere as well.
This paper examines how the Canadian courts have treated the concept of reasonable limits within the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms generally, though with a particular focus on how they have treated reasonable limits in the context of religious freedom. The dominant treatment has been in the form of what is often called a proportionality analysis—and often linked to a particular Supreme Court of Canada case that results in the Canadian analysis being called the “Oakes test.” 1At the same time, there are complex currents of discussion about difficulties with the assumptions embedded in this sort of analysis, and the paper will also highlight how there have been some calls for a modified approach to understanding reasonable limits on Charter rights and freedoms, even while recognizing that the dominant approach to proportionality analysis is strongly embedded in current Canadian law.
This discussion will include reference to a number of important religious-freedom cases, with these cases offering examples of particular limits on religious freedom that were considered reasonable or unreasonable. The next part of the paper will highlight some examples of recent laws in Canada that have been out of line with legal understandings of reasonable limits on religious freedom, while explaining how bringing the concept of reasonable limits to bear can facilitate a more nuanced, less polarized discussion of such laws.
The final part of the paper will consider some current issues—notably, ways in which religious freedom has been limited during the COVID-19 pandemic—and it will discuss how an understanding of freedoms subject to reasonable limits can facilitate a better discussion on these issues.
Reasonable Limits and the Oakes Test
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that the Charter “guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” 2From a constitutional-law perspective, in considering any particular Charter right or freedom it is thus a crucial question what constitutes a “reasonable limit.” This section of the paper attempts to analyze this question while mentioning a number of important religious-freedom cases where constitutional law on reasonable limits has been applied.
Before addressing the main analysis, it is worth noting that a number of leading religious-freedom cases raise some complex related questions of how this whole analysis is to be applied in the context of reviewing decisions of administrative boards and tribunals that affect Charter rights. The Supreme Court of Canada has gone through a period of urging a form of deference to these bodies, and thus not applying the full test discussed here, and that phenomenon has affected a number of leading religious-freedom cases through what is called the “Doré analysis.” 3One example would be the concurring opinion in the Ktunaxa case, a case concerning Indigenous religious-freedom claims in the context of a proposed ski-resort development. 4While the main judgment in the case effectively held that the ski-resort development did not raise religious-freedom issues, two concurring justices held that it did, that there were serious negative effects on Indigenous religious-freedom rights at issue, but that nonetheless the way in which the minister had considered these while carrying out a statutory mandate of allocating Crown lands to various uses was acceptable. 5The way the analysis works here does not directly consider the violation of rights to challenge the decision directly but deferentially looks at whether the minister considered the rights issues in the decision-making process. Some would raise questions about whether such an approach is sufficiently protective of Charter rights and freedoms. 6Whether the Supreme Court of Canada has done the right thing on these issues of how to analyze Charter rights in the context of administrative decisions has many complex dimensions and would warrant its own separate analysis.
Section 1 has been read as what is sometimes called an “external-limitations clause.” Many constitutions do not have an explicit clause referring to limits on the rights they protect, but courts then develop those limits in the course of interpreting each right. Thus, in the United States, there ends up being a slightly different understanding of limits on each specific right or freedom, developed in a jurisprudence pertaining to that right or freedom. By contrast, in Canada, the presence of an external-limitations clause in the written text of the constitution seemingly encouraged the courts to attempt to develop a methodology for understanding limits on rights and freedoms at a more general level. The section 1 test then applies to each right or freedom. 7
In doing so, courts also took the view that thinking of limits on rights and freedoms under that external framework would allow them to read the initial scope of rights and freedoms themselves more broadly. This is because there ends up being a different check on any overly broad conceptions of specific rights and freedoms, with that check involving the government justifying its limits but nonetheless allowing for sensible interpretations of the rights and freedoms at issue. Thus, for example, the courts have ended up reading freedom of expression in very broad ways so that they could insist on government justifications of any limits on expression.
In Canadian law, “reasonable limits” for the purposes of limits on rights have come to be interpreted in terms of what is called a proportionality analysis. While there are more details to understand concerning such an analysis, the basic idea is that governments act based on a variety of policy objectives, including protecting the rights of other people. This may lead to the government enacting policies that ultimately limit the scope of certain rights. These limits are subject to tests concerning whether they are appropriately proportionate as between the effects on the right or freedom that is limited versus what is achieved in terms of the policy goal or protection of others’ rights. This analysis is not a simple utilitarian weighing as it might first sound. Rather, it involves a variety of nuanced questions that consider whether these specific limits on rights and freedoms are actually needed and ultimately acceptable.
The government that has imposed limits needs to justify them, so this sort of proportionality analysis, while accepting the possibility of reasonable limits on rights and freedoms, is ultimately focused on respect for rights and freedoms. Such an analysis demands sufficient justifications for any limits on rights and freedoms. This onus of justification on the government is grounded in the terms of section 1 itself, which specifies that the government must show that the limits in question are “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Any failure to advance an adequate argument for a justification will lead to a conclusion against the government. 8
Analyses of proportionality as a way of engaging with tensions between different moral and legal considerations have deep foundations in Western legal, cultural, and religious traditions. Parts of the Hebrew Bible concerned with warfare set out principles of proportionality in how warfare was to be conducted so as to limit negative effects on civilian populations (Deuteronomy 20). This was of course located within a different cultural context in which permitted practices still appear harsh to us today, but it represented improvements within prevailing cultural contexts. The just-war tradition within Jewish rabbinical and Christian scholastic thinking continued and built on this concept over the centuries. 9Modern human-rights frameworks have similarly embraced this concept, with significant use of proportionality analyses especially in German law, European human-rights law, Canadian constitutional law, and in other systems influenced by these jurisdictions, including Israel and Commonwealth states such as South Africa. 10
Seemingly influenced in part by European human-rights law approaches, the Supreme Court of Canada developed a framework for proportionality analysis here in 1986 in the case of R. v. Oakes. Although the parts of that test are sometimes put into subgroups, it is easiest to understand the test as having four parts. These are often called “pressing and substantial objective,” “rational connection,” “minimal impairment,” and “final balancing.” Once an initial infringement of a right or freedom has been established, these four parts of the Oakes test function together to determine whether a legal limit on a right or freedom has met the standards of proportionality so as to be “demonstrably justified.” A law that fails to meet any of the four parts of the test is considered to have resulted in a violation of Charter rights and thus to give rise to a constitutional remedy, such as the striking down of that law.
We can say a bit more about each of the four components of the Oakes test. 11First, the “pressing and substantial objective” portion of the test is concerned with whether the government objective at issue is sufficiently important so as to potentially justify the limitation of a right. Obviously, protecting the rights of somebody else will qualify, but so may other sufficiently important government objectives. Since governments usually limit rights for important purposes rather than at random, this part of the test has seldom come into play despite remaining an important part of it. Notably, there could be an unconstitutional purpose if the very purpose of a law were to do something contrary to a Charter right or freedom. The Supreme Court of Canada held as such in relation to a Sunday closing law meant to enforce through the legal system the religious obligation of one faith where there was evidence of the historical purposes of the law to that effect. 12
There could also be a problem on this part of the test if limits were imposed on religious freedom for trivial reasons. The Amselem decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004 was technically a case arising under the religious-freedom provisions of Quebec’s Charter, which applies to private parties, rather than the Canadian Charter, which does not. But the Court’s analysis of religious freedom has come to be influential for the religious-freedom analysis under the Canadian Charter. The facts of the case concerned a condo board’s restrictions on the construction on balconies of temporary succahs (dwelling huts) during the nine-day Jewish festival of Succot. 13The Supreme Court of Canada held that such a limitation on religious freedom offered only trivial benefits for other owners and was thus unreasonable. 14
Second, the “rational connection” component of the test says that the law must be logically connected to the furtherance of the government objective at issue. The requirement of a rational connection is not a demanding standard, and this part of the test has also not been applied often, but it does potentially say that the courts could strike down a law that was obviously counterproductive to its goals, since there would then be a limitation of a right or freedom for no reason. Many of the cases where courts have used this part of the test have been critiqued—it is, after all, peculiar to end up with a conclusion that what the government did has no logical connection to its objectives. 15Examples do exist, however. In one case, a law imposed different security requirements on citizenship processes of children born abroad to Canadian mothers as opposed to those born abroad to Canadian fathers; the distinction between mothers and fathers in this context had no rational connection to the objectives of the law. 16But such situations will tend to arise mainly with a law that has simply been poorly drafted and should not be a common issue under the Oakes test.